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Fair and Sustainable Capitalism Proposal 
 
The incentive system for the governance of American corporations has failed in recent 
decades to adequately encourage long-term investment, sustainable business practices, and 
most importantly, fair gainsharing between shareholders and workers.  That should not be 
so.  This state of affairs exists in no small part because we have made public companies 
more and more responsive to the desires of the stock market, as represented by institutional 
investors with a demand for immediate returns.  This has resulted in declines in gainsharing 
of corporate profits with workers, a large increase in stock buybacks, skyrocketing CEO 
pay, and growing inequality.   
 
When looking for the causes of growing inequality and a corporate governance system that 
does not work for all, the usual subjects of criticism are the CEOs and boards of large 
companies, but very little is said about those who wield over 75% of shareholder voting 
power: institutional investors.  Most stock today is owned not by mom-and-pop investors 
who directly hold stock in individual companies, but by institutional investors who control 
human investors’ capital.  The majority of middle-class Americans fortunate enough to be 
invested in the stock market are in a real way forced capitalists.  These worker-investors 
must save for retirement through 401(k) and other tax-advantaged investments that require 
workers to turn over a portion of every paycheck to a family of mutual funds chosen by 
their employer.  The institutional investors, not these worker-investors, get to vote the 
public company stock that mutual funds buy with human investors’ capital. 
 
Corporations will not give more thoughtful consideration to their employees and social 
responsibility—that is, our corporate governance system and economy will not change—
unless the institutional investors who elect corporate boards also support doing so.  
Institutional investors have the most influence on corporations, and the imbalance in our 
corporate governance system can be fixed only by aligning institutional investors’ 
incentives with the interests of their end investors: human beings saving for retirement and 
their children’s college education.  Even more important, human beings who most of all 
need American corporations to pay good wages and create good jobs.   
 
The investment horizon of the ultimate source of most companies’ funding—human beings 
saving for retirement and education—is long.  That long-term horizon is much more 
aligned with what it takes to run a real business than the horizon of companies’ direct 
shareholders, who are money managers under strong pressure to deliver immediate returns 
at all times.  As diversified investors whose holdings track the overall economy, human 
investors do not benefit when companies offload the costs of their activities, such as carbon 
emissions and other pollution, onto others.  And as human beings who breathe air, consume 
products, and depend on a good job for most of their income, human investors suffer as 
citizens when companies take shortcuts that harm the environment, defraud or injure 
consumers, or offshore jobs to countries with low wages and few worker protections. 
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Human investors owe most of their wealth to their job.  This is true not only for the poorer 
half of Americans; it is true of 99% of Americans.  On average, Americans get 64% of 
their income from wages and another 15% from either retirement payments or other 
transfer payments.  For the middle and upper-middle class, jobs are even more important, 
with wages comprising 70% or more of income.  But the importance of work does not stop 
there.  Those in the 80th to 90th percentiles get 75% of their income from working, and 
those in the 95th to 99th percentiles still get over 60% from their labor.  As a result, human 
investors need companies to do business in a way that provides Americans with access to 
good jobs, sustainable wage growth, and a fair share of the wealth that businesses generate. 
 
In short, human investors benefit from sustainable, long-term economic growth and 
gainsharing between shareholders and workers, but companies have increasingly failed to 
deliver on that promise.  For about two and a half decades starting in the late 1940s, workers 
and investors shared in the wealth generated by a strong, growing economy.  In the early 
1970s, accelerating in the 1980s, and continuing since, that social compact has frayed.  
Since then, worker productivity has risen by about 70%, but hourly pay has grown by only 
12%.  Meanwhile, corporate profits have hit record highs.  In other words, American 
workers are more educated than ever, more skilled, and doing more to create corporate 
profits than ever, but they have shared far less in the fruits of that labor. 
 
To help redress this problem, workers must be given more voice within the corporate 
boardroom, and top managers and directors must give greater thought to how they treat 
their employees.  Companies should have board-level committees that ensure quality 
wages and fair worker treatment.  Labor law reforms should make it easier for employees 
to join a union and bargain over wages.   Likewise, to hold companies accountable for how 
they treat their workers, how they treat their consumers, and whether they operate in an 
ethical, sustainable, environmentally responsible manner, the public and investors deserve 
better information from companies about their performance on these critical dimensions.   
    
In addressing the decline in fair gainsharing with workers, we also cannot ignore the role 
of institutional investors in pushing for immediate returns and the poor incentives that 
pressure put on companies to take shortcuts that offload companies’ costs onto others, harm 
consumers, and undercut Americans’ access to quality jobs.  In no small part because of 
retirement policy decisions by U.S. lawmakers, institutional investors have come to 
dominate the governance of large U.S. corporations.  In the mid-20th century, individuals 
held the vast majority of U.S. public companies’ stock; today, institutional investors own 
about 78%.  And an increasingly small number of those institutional investors, which 
commentators have referred to as the “Big Three” or “Big Four,” are especially dominant.  
These institutional investors effectively dictate U.S. corporate policy by voting in corporate 
elections and on management and shareholder proposals at annual meetings.  Institutional 
investors elect companies’ boards of directors.  Institutional investors vote on whether to 
sell the company, back activist proposals, and support company executives’ compensation 
levels.  The power they exercise cannot be ignored as a factor in producing the decline in 
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fair gainsharing between workers and corporate shareholders.  Ultimately, operating 
companies will not act in a more responsible manner unless the institutional investors who 
control them support them in doing so.   
 
To ensure that operating companies act more responsibly toward their workers and other 
stakeholders, the institutional investors who are responsible for managing most human 
investors’ money must vote with their investors’ needs in mind.  And for index funds 
especially, they should have to tailor their voting policies and recommendations to the fact 
that they cannot sell their shares and are invested for the long haul.  To be fair, some 
institutional investors have started to consider environmental, social, and governance, or 
“ESG,” factors.  But if we want companies to operate in a socially responsible manner that 
creates sustainable profits, then all institutional investors who manage human investors’ 
money need to factor EESG considerations into their investing and voting decisions, and 
emphasize the vital missing “E”—the interests of companies’ employees.  That is, 
institutional investors must align their voting policies with the interests of their worker-
investors who need not just sustainable corporate profits, but also good jobs, clean air, and 
safe products. 
 
If companies are spending too much on stock buybacks, taking environmental shortcuts, or 
failing to adequately compensate and invest in their workforce, that is likely because their 
stockholders—i.e., institutional investors—have exerted pressures on companies that 
encouraged this state of affairs.  If the goal is to increase the gainsharing among 
corporations and their other stakeholders—workers, consumers, and society—that can be 
achieved only through aligning those doing the voting—institutional investors—with the 
interests of the flesh and blood human beings whose money the institutional investors 
manage and control.  Creating this alignment is achievable, and can be done through 
modest changes to current laws and regulations that govern institutional investors.   
 
Other complementary measures would also help to align incentives and promote 
sustainable, long-term economic growth that benefits all.  To start, we must consider tax 
and accounting policy.  That is, we must recognize the role of tax and accounting rules in 
creating incentives that encourage speculation and rapid portfolio turnover, rather than 
productive, sound long-term investing.  As important, our nation has long-term economic 
challenges that must be addressed by public investment and incentives that can be 
implemented only if we have the funds to pay for them.  Most notably, we have a huge 
infrastructure and basic research gap that is eroding our competitiveness and diminishing 
our quality of life.  We also cannot be blind to the reality that we need to supercharge our 
efforts to address climate change and to set an example for the world.  With real 
investments in basic research, cleaner, more efficient infrastructure, and worker training, 
we can create jobs in the United States, tackle climate change, help workers in carbon-
intensive industries transition to jobs in emerging clean energy companies, spark 
innovation, and enhance the long-term international competitiveness of American 
companies.  At the same time, by implementing good tax policy that addresses behavior 
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we want to have less of, we can use the savings to finance these investments in the future 
that create good jobs that cannot be sent overseas.   
 
Finally, we must address legal changes that have given corporate elites an unfair advantage 
over working Americans and human investors, including Supreme Court and regulatory 
decisions that have undercut the effectiveness of labor unions, deprived Americans of their 
day in court and fueled a massive growth in unchecked corporate political spending. 
 
*          *          * 
 
The bottom line is that America’s corporations are not playthings.  They create jobs, 
produce goods and services that consumers depend on, affect the environment we live in, 
and build wealth for human investors to save for retirement and their kids’ education.  That 
is, corporations are societally chartered institutions of enormous importance and value.  
Those who govern them ought to be accountable for the generation of durable wealth for 
workers, consumers, and human investors.  A new accountability system that supports 
wealth creation within a system of enlightened capitalism—one that aligns the interests of 
institutional investors and corporations with those of the human beings whose capital they 
control—is needed.  With some modest sacrifice by every interest that wields economic 
power, we can make our economy work better for all Americans.  This Proposal to promote 
Fair and Sustainable Capitalism would take several steps to make that goal a reality. 
 
Enhancing Disclosure for Operating Companies on Employee, Environmental, 
Social, and Governance Matters to Promote Sustainable, Long-Term Growth and 
Gainsharing with Workers 
 
Reforming our corporate governance system starts with the operating companies that make 
products and create jobs.  If companies do not focus on making sustainable profits by 
selling useful products and services, and treat their workforce well, our economy will not 
work fairly for everyone.  And if institutional investors are going to support and expect 
companies to behave in a socially responsible manner—one that serves the interests of 
human investors as workers, consumers, and citizens, not just as investors concerned with 
short-term changes in the value of their stock portfolio—then they need the right 
information to hold companies accountable.  As important, EESG disclosure is not just 
relevant for investors.  It is vital for Americans as human beings who are workers, 
consumers of products, and breathers of air.  Citizens deserve to have quality information 
about how the nation’s most influential businesses are treating their workers and 
consumers, and respecting our environment, laws, and ethical standards.  The Fair and 
Sustainable Capitalism Proposal therefore would: 
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 Require large, socially important companies to annually report on their 
businesses’ impact on workers, consumers, communities, the environment, and 
our nation.     
 
o Before institutional investors can hold corporations responsible for providing 
long-term growth in a sustainable way that benefits employees, consumers, 
and the environment, institutional investors need quality information.  The 
first step is thus to require companies to disclose more information about 
their businesses’ impact on employee, environmental, social, and governance 
matters (“EESG,” with an extra “E” for employees).  To ensure that more 
disclosure requirements do not discourage companies from going public or 
encourage them to go private, any reporting requirement should not be based 
on whether the firm is publicly traded.   
 
o Under the Proposal, any company with more than $1 billion in annual sales 
would be required to annually report information about its business’s impact 
on workers, consumers, communities in which the company operates, other 
stakeholders, and the environment (including climate change).  The 
Securities and Exchange Commission would develop rules, in consultation 
with the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce, the Department 
of Justice, and the Environmental Protection Agency, to standardize 
disclosure so that it is useful to investors, workers, consumers, and other 
stakeholders, as well as regulators who protect the public.  Reporting 
obligations would not be conditioned on whether the company’s stock is 
publicly traded, avoiding the perverse effect of encouraging companies to go 
private or discouraging emerging companies from going public.  These 
workable disclosure requirements would help both institutional investors and 
the public hold companies accountable for the impact of their businesses on 
stakeholders and society as a whole. 
 
 Require the boards of large, socially important companies to create workforce 
committees to address workforce issues at the board level.   
 
o Union membership has drastically declined from its peak of around 28% of 
the workforce in the 1950s to less than 11% today.  With this decline, it has 
become harder for workers to collectively bargain for fair wages, training 
that assures them continued employment, and a safe and hospitable 
workplace.  Meanwhile, in some other countries, such as Germany, workers 
have the right to be represented on the company’s board of directors through 
so-called “codetermination,” but foreign workers typically do not get the vote 
and it is not clear that codetermination fits with our economy.  But many 
capitalist nations without codetermination require that each company has a 
workers’ council or some other mechanism requiring ongoing consultation 
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with workers.  The U.S. system stands out for its lack of corporate 
governance rules or other policies and practices that ensure companies will 
consider worker concerns.  Combined with the drop in union representation, 
this failure may explain some of the decline in fair gainsharing between 
workers and companies that has occurred over the past several decades. 
 
o To make sure that companies give careful consideration to worker concerns 
at the board level, the Proposal requires the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Department of Labor, and the National Labor Relations 
Board to jointly develop rules that would require the boards of companies 
with more than $1 billion in annual sales to create and maintain a committee 
focused on workforce concerns.  By requiring these committees at all large 
corporations, not just public corporations, more accountability would be 
imposed on large private companies, such as those owned by private equity 
firms, to treat their workforce fairly.  These workforce committees would be 
focused on addressing fair gainsharing between workers and investors, the 
workers’ interest in training that assures continued employment, and the 
workers’ interest in a safe and tolerant workplace.  These workforce 
committees would also consider whether the company uses substitute forms 
of labor—such as contractors—to fulfill important corporate needs, and 
whether those contractors pay their workers fairly, provide safe working 
conditions, and are operating in an ethical way, and are not simply being used 
to inflate corporate profits at the expense of continuing employment and fair 
compensation for direct company employees.  Offering a middle-ground 
between the current system and “codetermination”-style worker 
representation, the committees would be required to develop and disclose a 
plan for consulting directly with the company’s workers about important 
worker matters such as compensation and benefits, opportunities for 
advancement, and training.  Finally, the National Labor Relations Act would 
be amended to ensure that companies can use dedicated committees to 
consult with their workers without running afoul of the Act’s prohibition on 
“dominating” labor organizations, provided that the company doesn’t 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to 
collective bargaining and self-organization.  In essence, this would allow for 
European-style “works councils” without impeding union formation and 
representation. 
 
 Change accounting rules to treat investments in human capital like other long-
term investments and require companies to disclose more information in 
narrative form about their human capital investments.   
 
o Accounting rules currently treat human capital investments as a cost that is 
expensed immediately instead of a long-term investment that is expensed 
  
7 
 
over time.  Given financial markets’ focus on short-term results, this can lead 
corporate managers to underinvest in human capital.  But investment in 
human capital is just as important as other long-term investments in plant and 
equipment and should be treated as such when being accounted for on a 
firm’s income statement and balance sheet.  Providing similar accounting 
treatment to human capital investments as other long-term corporate 
investments would encourage companies to invest in their workforces and 
diminish the incentive for activist hedge funds to campaign to reduce 
companies’ spending on their workers just to increase short-term returns. 
 
o To fix this problem, the Proposal would require the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to instruct the Financial Accounting Standards Board to revise 
generally accepted accounting principles to treat investments in human 
capital as capital expenditures like investments in plants, property, and 
equipment, and the Commission would develop rules requiring public 
companies to disclose in narrative form additional information about their 
investments in human capital.   
 
 Require companies releasing quarterly earnings guidance to make other 
necessary and appropriate disclosures.   
 
o No rational person believes that corporations can deliver consistent, quarter-
to-quarter earnings growth nor that corporations should be managed with that 
objective in mind, especially in light of the fact that most of their capital 
comes from human investors who are saving for the long run and therefore 
need sustainable growth, not bubble returns.  Forward-looking quarterly 
earnings estimates provide little value to investors but continue to contribute 
to managing to the market in an unproductive way.  And isolated issuer 
restraint is of little utility as competitive realities lead to a collective lack of 
discipline and wisdom because CEOs fear the loss of analyst coverage if they 
refuse to feed the market beast and their competitors continue to do so.   
 
o The Proposal would have the SEC promulgate rules requiring companies to 
disclose more information or adhere to other standards if companies are 
going to release forward-looking quarterly earnings estimates.  Under the 
Proposal, the SEC must require any company that issues quarterly guidance 
to maintain, make public, and keep current a long-term plan for earnings 
growth and situate any quarterly guidance within the context of that long-
term plan.  By requiring companies to disclose long-term plans along with 
their forward-looking quarterly estimates, managers would be able to focus 
more on sustainable, long-term corporate growth and less on meeting the 
market’s short-term expectations, and institutional investors would have a 
roadmap to hold corporations accountable for sustainable performance.   
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 Make it easier for large corporations to become benefit corporations and 
commit to fair treatment of their workers, consumers, society, and the 
environment. 
 
o Recently, the Business Roundtable made a promising statement recognizing 
that businesses have a responsibility to treat all their stakeholders well and 
to be socially responsible citizens.  Skepticism exists about whether that 
statement is just talk.  One concrete way business leaders can move from 
rhetoric to fairer treatment for workers, consumers, and the communities that 
their businesses affect is for the Business Roundtable to support having their 
corporations adopt the Benefit Corporation model.  This model, which has 
been adopted by the leading corporate state of Delaware, requires, by use of 
the word “shall” and other means, that the corporation treat all stakeholders 
fairly, even in a sale of the corporation.  The model is conservative in that 
the only constituency with a vote remains the stockholders, and thus their 
support for social responsibility is what keeps the board accountable.  To 
move toward this sensible model, however, unreasonable barriers must be 
removed that require a supermajority vote or create a right to appraisal if a 
corporation is to opt into the Benefit Corporation model or if a corporation 
merges into an existing Benefit Corporation.  There is no principled basis for 
this discrimination against Benefit Corporations, as the Benefit Corporation 
model contains all the strong fiduciary and statutory protections against self-
dealing and unfair treatment available under corporate laws like Delaware’s.  
A majority vote of stockholders to move to Benefit Corporation model 
should be enough.  And, if the Business Roundtable, institutional investors, 
and policy makers get behind this principled approach, entrepreneurs would 
have far less reason to argue for giving themselves stock with special voting 
power to protect other stakeholders, because a one-share, one vote model 
would exist that requires fair treatment of stakeholders. 
 
Strengthening Institutional Investors’ Obligations to Promote Sustainable, Long-
Term Growth and Serve the Interests of Human Investors  
 
Requiring operating companies to make EESG disclosures is a good start, but inadequate 
step.  We cannot expect companies to focus on creating long-term sustainable value for 
workers, investors, and other stakeholders if those who elect the board and vote on 
management’s compensation are more focused on the next quarter than the company’s 
ability to generate durable returns.  Because Americans must give their retirement and 
college savings to institutional investors, institutional investors now dominate the 
governance of public corporations.  These institutional investors should be required to use 
their voting power in a way that is aligned with the interests of the worker-investors whose 
retirement and college savings money they control.  Institutional investors should be 
expected to consider the need these worker-investors have for sustainable wealth creation, 
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and their interests as human beings who need our economy to produce good jobs that pay 
good wages and to generate wealth in a way that does not harm the environment or 
consumers.   
 
But requiring institutional investors to account for the investment objectives and human 
realities of their worker-investors is not enough if they do not have information about the 
other investors—typically activist investors—making proposals to change a company’s 
strategic direction.  Requiring these activist investors to disclose more information about 
their positions and the nature of their capital is therefore necessary for the corporate 
electorate to make an informed vote on these significant decisions.  And finally, attention 
should also be paid to so-called “private funds,” such as hedge funds and private equity 
funds, which are often able to escape giving full disclosure to investors, despite taking 
money from pension funds that many Americans rely on for retirement and from 
universities and charities that advance important, publicly subsidized purposes. 
 
The Fair and Sustainable Capitalism Proposal would: 
 
 Require institutional investors to consider their ultimate beneficiaries’ specific 
investment objectives and horizons, such as saving for retirement or education, 
as part of their fiduciary duties, and empower institutional investors to 
consider their ultimate beneficiaries’ economic and human interest in having 
companies create quality jobs, and act ethically and responsibly toward their 
consumers and the environment.   
 
o To start, institutional investors’ fiduciary duties must be modified to both 
impose additional accountability and free institutions to consider their 
beneficiaries’ interests as human beings who are not just investors, but 
workers, parents, breathers of air, and citizens.  Currently, the funds that 
Americans are invested in do not have to vote in a way that is tailored to the 
specific investment objectives of the funds and their investors.  That is, 
instead of considering the particular investment horizon or financial needs of 
the investors in each fund, the funds in the same fund family (e.g., 
BlackRock, Vanguard, Fidelity, etc.) all tend to vote the same way.  But most 
worker-investors are rational index fund investors.  And, an index fund will 
not exit until the portfolio stock leaves the index because its investment 
strategy requires it to hold all stocks in the index.  Too often, index funds do 
not vote this unique stuck-in perspective.  Rather, the index fund will vote 
the same way as the actively traded funds in the fund complex, regardless of 
the fact that the active funds do not hold their investments for the long-term, 
and regardless of key factors such as whether the issue on the table is a stock-
for-stock merger in which the index fund holds both the acquirer and the 
target.  This situation must change if corporations are to be responsive to the 
flesh and blood human beings who provide their capital.  Requiring 
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institutional investors to consider the investment horizons and objectives of 
their ultimate beneficiaries will align institutional investors’ voting behavior 
with the interest of the human investors whose capital they manage.   
 
o Not only that, but proxy advisors remain highly influential in our corporate 
governance system.  If institutional investors are going to vote with the 
interests of their ultimate beneficiaries in mind, then institutional investors 
must not rely on proxy advisory firm recommendations unless the proxy 
advisor’s recommendations are tailored to the fund’s investment style and 
horizon.  This requirement would create incentives for proxy advisory firms 
to do better; and in particular, encourage them to develop voting 
recommendations and policies tailored to index investors, who are uniquely 
long-term and committed to sustainable wealth creation. 
 
o Under the Proposal, large institutional investors who take human investors’ 
money, including mutual funds and pension funds, would be required to 
consider the specific investment objectives and horizons of their ultimate 
beneficiaries, such as saving for retirement, saving for their children’s 
education, or investing in a socially responsible manner, when making voting 
and other stewardship decisions.  Specific obligations would be imposed on 
index and pension funds that would have to consider their investors’ interests 
in sustainable, long-term growth and the diversified nature of their portfolios. 
 
o As important, any covered institutional investor would be authorized to 
consider their ultimate beneficiaries’ overall economic and human welfare, 
including their interests as workers, taxpayers, consumers, and human beings 
who live in the environment, in determining how to prudently invest their 
funds for sustainable, ethical portfolio growth.  This plain and simple 
authorization for investment funds to consider EESG factors will eliminate 
any fear that institutional investors cannot take into account the moral and 
ethical factors that human investors can consider.  This will help align 
institutional investors’ voting and stewardship practices with the interests of 
the human investors who give these institutions money every paycheck. 
 
 Require institutional investors to explain how their voting policies and other 
stewardship practices ensure the faithful discharge of their new fiduciary 
duties and take into account the new information reported by large companies 
on employee, environmental, social, and governance matters.   
 
o To ensure investors and regulators that institutional investors are voting and 
engaging with operating companies in a way that serves the interests of the 
human investors whose money they manage, the new fiduciary obligations 
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imposed on institutional investors should be accompanied by parallel 
disclosure requirements.   
 
o Accordingly, the Proposal would require the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the Department of Labor, in consultation with the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, to develop rules requiring covered institutional investors 
to make annual disclosures explaining how their voting policies and other 
stewardship practices (i) address the Proposal’s newly imposed fiduciary 
duties; (ii) account for the information that the Proposal requires large 
companies to disclose about their worker, environmental, social, and 
governance impact; and (iii) address the specific objectives of the 
institutional investors’ ultimate beneficiaries.  This required disclosure 
would also have parallels with the disclosure obligations imposed on 
operating companies. 
 
 Close loopholes so that activist hedge funds have to make a full and timely 
disclosure of their economic interests in the companies they seek to influence.   
 
o If institutional investors are to effectively represent their beneficiaries’ long-
term interests, they need up-to-date information about those making 
proposals affecting corporations’ business plans and corporate governance 
rules.  Over the last two decades, the model of shareholder engagement has 
changed profoundly.  In the past, shareholders commonly did not seek to 
pressure companies to take actions that changed fundamental corporate 
business plans and strategies in a way that affected other shareholders and, 
most important, employees.  But today, shareholders—typically activist 
hedge funds—often seek influence to do just that.  These shareholders pose 
substantial risks for other shareholders, especially long-term capital 
providers like the institutional investors who hold the retirement savings of 
worker-investors.  These activists also affect the interest of company 
employees, whose livelihood can be put in danger by risky proposals to pump 
up immediate profits in an unsustainable way.  It is up to the entire corporate 
electorate to consider the proposals of activists, but because the electorate 
cannot do so effectively without accurate and up-to-date information on 
activist investors’ incentives, economic interests in the companies they invest 
in, capital position, and holding periods.  
 
o Under current law, activist investors who seek to influence management—
such as activist hedge funds—are already required to make a special 
“Schedule 13D” filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission once 
they acquire 5% of the company’s stock so that their interest in the company 
is known to other investors.  But various loopholes have allowed activist 
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investors to avoid making full and timely disclosure of their interests.  If 
institutional investors are going to rationally consider activist investors’ 
proposed changes to a company’s strategic direction, more information about 
the activists’ economic interests and how they align with the interests of the 
company’s long-term human investors is needed.  If, for example, an activist 
is arguing for a company to cut its capital expenditures and pay a special 
dividend, but the activist is contractually required to sell its stock in three 
years because its fund must liquidate, the other shareholders are entitled to 
know about that.  And because the current disclosure regime dates from the 
1960s and was not designed to address the market developments that have 
allowed—through techniques such as derivatives and all-day trading—the 
aggregation of influential blocks of stock before the public markets know 
what is going on, the SEC’s current rule must be changed to prevent activists 
from gaining creeping control without paying a control premium before 
disclosing their proposal to management and other investors.  This will bring 
the United States current with other markets such as the European Union. 
 
o To close the existing loopholes, the Proposal would require the Securities 
and Exchange Commission to revise its rules governing Schedule 13D 
disclosures so that: (i) the definition of beneficial ownership would include 
ownership of any derivative instrument that provides the opportunity to profit 
from an increase in the value of the subject security and any contract or 
device that allows the person to control the voting power of the equity 
security; (ii) any activist investor required to file a Schedule 13D would also 
be required to disclose any short interest or ownership of a derivative 
instrument that allows the investor to profit from a decrease in the security’s 
value; (iii) any 13D filer would be prohibited from acquiring additional 
shares (or derivatives) once the investor crosses the 5% threshold (for large-
cap companies) or a 10% threshold (for smaller companies) until a 13D has 
been filed and available to the public for 24 hours; and (iv) any 13D filer 
would be required to disclose any contractual or other arrangement that 
relates to the filer’s commitment or ability to hold the subject security, 
including the ability of the filer’s investors, if any, to redeem or withdrawal 
their capital.  Additionally, the “investment-only” exception to the Hart–
Scott–Rodino filing requirements would be revised for Schedule 13D and 
13G filers so that Hart–Scott–Rodino filings do not function as a substitute 
for 13D and 13G filings for transactions that do not pose meaningful antitrust 
concerns. 
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 Require an SEC study on the investor protection risks from private funds that 
are subject to only limited disclosure requirements.   
 
o Under current law, hedge funds and private equity funds may solicit the 
investment of any “accredited investor” without providing meaningful or 
standardized disclosure about the fund’s or manager’s past performance or 
other risks.  This accredited investor exception was originally intended as a 
sort of “Thurston Howell” exception, because that iconic figure from 
Gilligan’s Island comes to mind as the sort of rich person policymakers 
believed could proceed at his own risk.  Put simply, the idea was that if 
hugely rich people wanted to risk their wealth, they could.  That exception 
was never intended to allow funds on which ordinary Americans depend for 
their pensions, universities that educate our children, or key charitable 
institutions like the Red Cross and Boys & Girls Clubs of America to be able 
to put money at risk in investments not backed up by appropriate disclosures 
and standards of integrity.  But today, pension funds, university endowments, 
and charities can qualify as accredited investors (and “qualified purchasers,” 
which are effectively “super” accredited investors, under the laws governing 
investment funds), thus ultimately exposing human investors to the risks that 
come with hedge fund and private equity fund investing.  Nothing is 
intrinsically wrong with the private equity or hedge fund business model, but 
problems have arisen when pension funds that workers rely on for their 
retirement or charitable institutions endowed to provide critical social 
services invest in opaque private funds without adequate disclosure.  These 
losses hurt workers and society and can require taxpayers to fill the resulting 
holes.  Absent appropriate and reliable disclosure around past performance, 
the fees charged to all the funds’ investors, and the basic strategy and 
holdings of the fund, pension funds and charities too often entrust their 
beneficiaries’ hard-earned capital without enough information to prudently 
assess whether the investment is appropriate for their portfolio on both a risk-
return basis and on a cost basis.  Of course, disclosure should be tailored to 
the fund’s investments, e.g., hedge funds should not be required to disclose 
proprietary information about their trading strategies to the public.  But 
pension funds and large charity endowments need enough reliable 
information to make informed investment decisions.   
 
o Under the Proposal, the Securities and Exchange Commission would be 
required to submit a study to Congress on the investor protection risks and 
benefits of private funds that are subject to only limited disclosure 
requirements, such as hedge funds and private equity funds.  This study 
would have to include (i) an assessment of the adequacy of the disclosures 
that such private funds provide to their investors; (ii) an assessment of 
whether fund managers are adequately and reliably disclosing their 
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performance history; (iii) an assessment of the fees charged by these 
investment managers and whether certain classes of investors are paying 
more to access these investments; (iv) an assessment of how frequently fund 
managers offer superior investment terms to certain favored investors and 
whether disclosure about those favorable terms is available to other 
investors; and (v) an assessment of whether the universe of accredited 
investors and qualified purchasers is appropriately defined to include only 
sophisticated investors who can fend for themselves.  The study would also 
include recommendations about whether additional regulation or legal 
authority is needed to address these concerns. 
 
Reforming the Corporate Electoral System to Promote Sustainable, Long-Term 
Growth  
 
Reforms at the operating company and institutional investor level must be accompanied by 
reforms to the corporate electoral system.  If we want institutional investors to wisely focus 
their voting decisions on sustainable corporate performance, we must reduce the continual 
mini-referendums occurring each year and the huge number of votes shareholders must 
cast each year, which encourages companies to manage to the changing whims of the stock 
market and institutional investors to outsource voting decisions to proxy advisory firms.  
With fewer but more meaningful votes, we can have a vibrant accountability system better 
focused on whether corporations are producing profits in a socially responsible manner.  
To that end, the Fair and Sustainable Capitalism Proposal would: 
 
 Change the “say-on-pay” voting system to promote more thoughtful voting by 
requiring companies to hold shareholder votes on executive compensation once 
every four years (or sooner upon any material change in executive 
compensation) and present shareholders with a four-year plan for each vote.   
 
o One impediment to thoughtful voting is the substantial number of “say-on-
pay” votes on executive compensation—over 2,000 per year—that 
institutional investors must cast at U.S. public companies every year.  
Because executive compensation should be designed to provide top 
executives with appropriate incentives to manage well and create sustainable 
long-term increases in corporate value, it is counterproductive that 
compensation arrangements should run on annual terms, with constant 
tinkering and changing of key provisions.  Rather, compensation committees 
should bargain for and set employment contracts with a meaningful length 
over which to assess the contribution of management to the corporation.  
Likewise, if shareholders are going to be given voice in those arrangements, 
their voice should be exercised in a mature fashion consistent with the actual 
arrangements that will be binding on the corporation and with their sensible 
length.  No one who cares about America’s worker-investors believes that 
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corporate executives should be paid based on year-to-year incentives.  
Rather, they should be rewarded for helping to create sustainable corporate 
profits, and their pay contracts should therefore be long term in nature.  But 
instead of voting on long-term pay plans on a sensible schedule, say-on-pay 
votes are held annually, and likely because of the overwhelming number of 
these annual say-on-pay votes, academic research has found that institutional 
investors often rely heavily on proxy advisory firms in their voting on these 
resolutions (with less than ideal consequences).  CEO pay continues to rise 
faster than the pay of company employees overall, and recent research 
bolsters the view that the current system of annual say-on-pay voting isn’t 
working to close that gap. 
 
o To mitigate these problems and allow more thoughtful voting by institutional 
investors, the Proposal would change the “say-on-pay” requirements 
imposed on public companies by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act so that companies would be required to hold a say-
on-pay vote every four years, or sooner if there is any material change in the 
terms of the executive compensation, based on a pay plan covering at least 
the next four-year period.  The SEC would be required to establish a schedule 
so that approximately 25% of public companies have a pay vote each year, 
allowing for informed voting on a four-year track record rationally related to 
sustainable performance.  Ultimately, this would result in more thoughtful 
voting by shareholders, helping to realize the vision that Congress originally 
had for say-on-pay votes. 
 
 Modify the SEC’s shareholder proposal rule to require proponents of economic 
shareholder proposals to have a genuine stake in the company and modestly 
increase resubmissions thresholds so that proposals that repeatedly fail by 
large margins are left off the ballot in future years.   
 
o Some modest changes to the rules governing shareholder proposals could 
also encourage more thoughtful voting by institutional investors and increase 
the benefit to cost ratio of the corporate voting process.  Although the SEC’s 
shareholder proposal rule likely plays a salutary role overall, some 
proponents—especially small-stakes proponents making economic 
proposals—have been less than thoughtful in deciding which companies to 
target for proposals, which recent academic research has found burdens the 
system with unnecessary and value-destroying votes.  That finding is 
unsurprising: how actual end-user investors or corporate performance are 
aided by having hundreds of poorly targeted votes each year is difficult to 
understand.  But what is certain is that institutional investors cannot 
rationally focus on all of them, limiting their ability to spend energy and 
attention on legitimate proposals that may benefit the corporation.   
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o These burdensome shareholder proposals are encouraged (or at least not 
discouraged) by law, which currently allows a shareholder holding as little 
as $2,000 in the company’s stock to make a proposal and have the company 
(and thus other shareholders and constituents like company employees) pay 
for the substantial costs of including the proposal on the corporate ballot and 
responding to it, generating too many proposals by shareholders with little 
stake in the company’s future and thereby overwhelming the capacity of the 
investors voting on those proposals to meaningfully inform themselves as to 
the proposals’ merits.  This should not be so.  In most states, candidates for 
public office are required to pay a reasonable filing fee tied to a percentage 
of the salary of the office they seek.  And, California requires a $2,000 filing 
fee for ballot initiatives.  It is reasonable and productive to ask the same of 
investors who seek to change the business plans or governance of a company.  
Requiring sponsors of economic proposals filed under Rule 14a-8 to pay a 
reasonable filing fee to bear a tiny fraction of the much larger costs their 
proposal will impose on the corporation, and therefore other shareholders 
and corporate constituents like workers, is a responsible method to better 
recalibrate the benefit–cost ratio of the shareholder proposal rule. 
 
o Accordingly, the Proposal would require the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to revise its shareholder proposal rule so that shareholders 
seeking to make an “economic” shareholder proposal, such as a proposal 
requesting the removal of takeover defenses, at company expense would 
need to hold the lesser of $2 million or 1% of the company’s stock (with 
proponents having the option to aggregate their shares with any other 
shareholders willing to join in the proposal to satisfy the ownership 
requirement).  This is an achievable number that shows that the proponents 
have a serious enough stake to justify the costs the proposal will have for 
others.  It is like the requirement in states like California to get support from 
at least 5% of voters before a ballot institute goes forward, but is by 
comparison far easier and less costly to achieve.  Additionally, the Proposal 
would require a proponent of an economic proposal to pay a $2,000 fee to 
have the proposal placed on the corporate ballot.  These two requirements 
would not apply to environmental and social proposals; thus, for example, a 
proponent of a resolution encouraging the company to take action on climate 
change would be exempt from the new eligibility requirements.  Finally, the 
Proposal would modestly increase the thresholds at which all proposals that 
fail to gain a meaningful share of the vote can be excluded in later years.  
Currently, a proposal that gets as little as 3% of the vote can still be included 
in later years; under the Proposal, a proposal would be excludable if it fails 
to gain 5% in the first year, 10% in the second year, or 20% in the third year.  
This clock would reset after five years.  And this change would help investors 
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to focus more on assessing the merits of the proposals that are likely to 
actually gain wide support, and prevent idiosyncratic shareholders from 
repeatedly costing other shareholders and corporate constituents time and 
money over a proposal that has not garnered any substantial level of support. 
 
 Require shareholders attempting to change a company’s corporate 
governance—either by making shareholder proposals or soliciting proxies—to 
disclose their economic interest in the company.   
 
o If institutional investors representing American worker-investors are going 
to rationally consider shareholder proposals or proxy challenges, more 
information is needed about those who are making these proposals.  Investors 
cannot fully consider an activist’s proposal if the investor does not know 
whether the activist making the proposal has a genuine, long-term interest in 
the company’s sustainable profitability.  Activist shareholders who seek 
changes in a company’s business plans or a breakup of the business have a 
huge impact on company employees and other shareholders.  The 
institutional investors who hold the capital of working Americans should 
have better information to know if the activists’ economic interests are 
aligned with the interests of patient investors such as index investors and 
others who hold stock for the long run.  
 
o To that end, the Proposal would require those making shareholder proposals 
or soliciting proxies to disclosure in clear and standard form their net 
beneficial ownership interest in the company’s securities.  Disclosure of their 
beneficial ownership interest would include any short interest or ownership 
of any derivative instrument or any contract or device that allows the person 
to control the voting power of the equity security.   
 
Updating Our Tax System to Reduce Speculation, Address Climate Change,  and 
Promote Sustainable Growth, Innovation, and Job Creation  
 
In tandem with reforms to operating company disclosure, institutional investors, and the 
proxy system, our tax system must also be reformed to provide the right incentives for 
companies and investors to focus on promoting sustainable, long-term growth.  Adoption 
of a sensible fractional trading tax on all securities transactions, including transactions by 
401(k) investors, and capital gains reform to make eligibility for the preferential long-term 
rate dependent on actual long-term investment would help all investors focus more on 
sustainable returns.  Not only that, but taxes like these discourage unproductive and 
destabilizing speculation of the kind that contributed to the financial crisis.  In addition, tax 
changes applicable to hedge fund managers’ compensation can place everyone on the same 
playing field, ensure that the labor income produced by private equity and hedge fund 
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executives is taxed on the same basis as the sweat put in by other American workers, and 
help ensure that Wall Street pays its fair share of taxes.  Not only that, but these taxes can 
help close a deficit that has widened after the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
while also providing necessary funds for investment in infrastructure modernization, 
tackling climate change, cutting-edge research and development to secure America’s 
position as a global leader in innovation and the industries of the future, and workplace 
training to ensure that American workers are ready to tackle this century’s technological 
challenges and have quality jobs.  To accomplish these goals, the Fair and Sustainable 
Capitalism Proposal would: 
 
 Change the holding period for long-term capital gains from one year to five.   
 
o Currently, an investment needs to be held for only one year to be considered 
“long term,” which allows short-term investors to take advantage of the 
preferential low tax rate for genuine, long-term capital gains.   
 
o The Proposal would change this period to five years, thereby helping to 
promote long-term investment and discourage harmful speculation. 
 
 Establish a financial transaction tax.   
 
o The Proposal would impose a very modest tax on most financial transactions, 
including the trading of stocks, mutual funds, bonds, and derivatives.  This 
small tax would moderate excessive speculation, curb uneconomic high-
frequency trading with no fundamental investment rationale that can 
contribute to financial system instability, encourage more thoughtful long-
term investing, and discourage irrational fund-hopping by mutual fund 
consumers.  All these incentives will help institutional investors as well as 
mutual funds better concentrate on stable investment strategies focused on 
sustainable growth—the kind that allows for fair gainsharing with company 
workers and provides funds for investors when they retire.  Estimated to 
generate over $2 trillion over 10 years, this tax should be used as a down-
payment on important, long-term investments in sustainable growth.  A 
financial transaction tax has been supported by leading economists such as 
Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz. 
 
o The rate for this tax would be 0.5% for equity securities, 0.1% for bonds, and 
0.005% for derivatives. 
 
 Close the carried interest loophole.   
 
o Under current law, some of the nation’s wealthiest individuals—hedge fund 
and private equity managers—pay a lower tax rate than average Americans 
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because the bulk of their income is taxed at the preferential 20% long-term 
capital gains tax rate as so-called “carried interest,” rather than at the ordinary 
income tax rate of 37%, even though they are effectively being paid for their 
labor.  Ensuring our system works for all also requires eliminating this unfair 
tax advantage hedge funds get over other human laborers.  Closing this 
loophole would also diminish the ability of hedge fund managers to reap 
profits not shared with their investors and their targets’ other shareholders in 
the long-run, thereby shifting the activist hedge fund market directionally 
toward those fund managers able to generate value by contributing 
managerial expertise that creates durable value for the public companies in 
its portfolio.  And because the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 gave the 
majority of its tax breaks to wealthier Americans and increased the federal 
deficit substantially, closing the carried interest loophole is a fairer and more 
productive way to restore some equity to the Tax Code, while also helping 
to reduce the deficit or provide for other important national needs.   
 
o The Proposal would close the carried interest loophole by requiring private 
equity or hedge fund managers’ compensation—in whatever form—be taxed 
as income, not as capital gains.   
 
 Create an Infrastructure, Innovation, and Human Capital Trust Fund.   
 
o It is no secret that our nation currently lags in infrastructure and research 
spending, hurting the ability of American businesses to compete globally, 
and there has been bipartisan consensus that these problems need to be 
addressed. 
 
o To ensure that the funds raised by the financial transaction tax are used to 
promote sustainable development, the Proposal would transfer all the 
revenue raised by the financial transaction tax into a newly created 
Infrastructure, Innovation, and Human Capital Trust Fund.  Congress could 
spend capital in the trust fund on only basic research and development, 
revitalizing our nation’s infrastructure in an environmentally responsible 
way that helps us redress climate change, and workplace training.  In 
particular, as the United States transitions to less carbon intensive energy 
production, those in carbon-intensive industries will require help 
transitioning their high quality skills to the evolving skills needed to work 
with these new energy technologies.  To that end, the funds in the 
Infrastructure, Innovation, and Human Capital Trust Fund could be used to 
provide training, support, and other assistance to help employees working in 
carbon-intensive industries transition to quality employment in industries 
generating energy in non-carbon intensive ways and to other emerging 
industries.  This $2 trillion investment over the next 10 years can help create 
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a sustainable, carbon-efficient transportation system and electrical grid, and 
aid the development of next-generation energy solutions, among other long-
term, sustainable projects, while creating thousands of well-paying jobs that 
cannot be shipped overseas.   
 
Curbing Corporate Power and Leveling the Playing Field for Workers, Consumers, 
and Investors  
 
Lastly, we must address three sets of challenges created in no small part by the United 
States Supreme Court, which have amplified corporate power at the expense of American 
workers, consumers, and human investors.  In the 2010 decision Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission striking down the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-
Feingold), the Supreme Court unleashed a massive growth in unchecked corporate political 
spending, which major institutional investors have so far been unwilling to address—even 
though the human investors whose money they manage do not invest their money so it can 
be spent by corporations on politics.  And in a series of decisions blessing the increased 
use of forced arbitration, the Supreme Court has allowed businesses to deny workers, 
consumers, and human investors their day in court and has blocked the States from 
exercising their sovereign right to decide how best to enforce their own laws.  Finally, in 
recent decisions such as Harris v. Quinn and Janus v. American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, the U.S. Supreme Court has added to the 
difficulties for American workers seeking to exercise in an effective way their right to form 
a union and collectively bargain.  These adverse decisions came on top of existing statutory 
roadblocks to a majority of workers being able to seek greater gainsharing through 
collective bargaining. 
 
Other proposals, such as the Do No Harm Act, should also be enacted to address the 
amplification of corporate power, and diminution in the rights of working people to receive 
minimum federally guaranteed benefits of employment, condoned by Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby.  But, to address the problems identified above, the Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 
Proposal would: 
 
 Prohibit public companies from spending money on politics without the 
consent of at least 75% of their shareholders.    
 
o Human investors do not invest their money for corporate executives to spend 
it on politics.  We know this because this is not how institutional investors 
advertise to attract investors, and because human investors are as diverse as 
the nation and there is no rational reason to believe they have similar views 
on political issues.  Corporate political spending also harms human investors 
seeking long-term sustainable earnings.  Businesses that have to lobby and 
rent-seek to get ahead are less profitable.  Not only that, but as most human 
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investors invest through index funds, any benefit that does accrue to one 
company through political lobbying is offset by harms to another and washes 
out for the index investor who holds the market.  As important, worker-
investors are taxpayers, and it hits the economic bottom line if businesses can 
externalize costs of ethical, sustainable ways of doing business to the public 
in the form of environmental harm that must be cleaned up or injured workers 
or consumers. 
 
o To ensure that human investors’ money is not being spent on politics without 
their consent, the Proposal would bar public companies from making any 
disbursement for a political purpose without first obtaining the consent, 
either for that specific disbursement or under a general policy allowing 
disbursements of that type, of at least 75% of their shareholders.  This 
provision tracks a proposal by the late John Bogle, the respected founder of 
the index fund giant Vanguard. 
 
 Enhance fairness and restore State sovereignty over the enforceability of 
forced arbitration clauses.   
 
o The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act 
to apply to a broad range of disputes to which it was not originally intended 
to apply, such as disputes between workers and their employers, thereby 
denying American workers and consumers their day in court by funneling 
them into secretive arbitration proceedings.  This is especially problematic 
for consumer disputes that are important but not worth enough for a lawyer 
to take on the case unless consumers are allowed to join together in a class 
action.  Moreover, this expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration 
Act—which has applied to not only lawsuits arising under Federal law, but 
also lawsuits arising under State law—has blocked the States from 
determining how to best enforce their own laws.  
 
o To stop the unfair application of the Federal Arbitration Act to disputes to 
which Congress never intended it to apply and restore State sovereignty so 
that the States can determine for themselves how their own laws should be 
enforced, the Fair and Sustainable Capitalism Proposal would amend the 
Federal Arbitration Act so that: (i) for employment, consumer, antitrust, 
securities, internal affairs, and civil rights disputes that arise under Federal 
law, forced arbitration clauses would be enforceable only if applicable 
Federal law other than the Federal Arbitration Act (such as the Fair Labor 
Standards Act or some other substantive law) makes them enforceable; and 
(ii) for employment, consumer, antitrust, securities, internal affairs, and civil 
rights disputes that arise under State law, forced arbitration clauses would be 
enforceable only if applicable State law makes them enforceable. 
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 Reform the union election progress by permitting card check elections to make 
it easier for workers to organize and collectively bargain with their employers.  
 
o Reforming the corporate election process is a strong start on the path to 
increased gainsharing between workers and corporations.  But to restore 
shared prosperity and create an economy that benefits all Americans, 
working Americans also need the ability to collectively organize and bargain 
with their employers.  At least since the Reagan Administration, the ability 
of American workers to use the rights guaranteed by the National Labor 
Relations Act (“NLRA”) has been increasingly compromised.  As a result, 
the leverage of American workers to obtain fair pay has been weakened, 
contributing to growing inequality and a decline in fair gain sharing between 
corporations and their workers.  Labor’s declining influence has only been 
further eroded by recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, such as Janus 
v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and 
Harris v. Quinn, that treat labor unions in a disfavored manner in comparison 
to corporations in the area of political spending, and that have now gone 
further and denied unions the right to obtain fair payments from workers they 
advocate for in pay negotiations and protect from unfair discharge or 
demotions.  The important reforms contained in the Protecting the Right to 
Organize Act should become law to address this diminution in worker voice.  
But an additional important step should be taken.  Current law hinders 
workers’ ability to organize because even after a majority of workers signs a 
petition or authorization card supporting unionization (informally known as 
“card check”), a company can still demand a formal, time-consuming 
election during which the company can seek to erode the union’s support and 
delay collective bargaining.  That is, even after a majority of employees 
support unionization, an employer can delay its formation and potentially 
avoid unionization all together by pressuring workers during the secret ballot 
campaign.  Unsurprisingly, studies suggest that unionization rates are higher 
when unions are recognized after a majority of workers sign a petition 
supporting unionization, and union members enjoy higher wages and more 
robust benefits packages compared to non-union workforces.   
 
o If we are to improve the wages of American workers, the effectiveness of the 
NLRA’s promise to American workers needs to be renewed by granting 
unions obtaining a fair showing of majority support recognition and the right 
to bargain on behalf of the workforce for fair wages and working conditions.    
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